Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games by Fukao, Kyoji
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title












Discussion Paper Series A No.299 
 
Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information 
and Global Games 
 
 















The Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 










 Kyoji  Fukao 
The Institute of Economic Research 













I would like to thank Roland Benabou, Russell Cooper, Kiminori Matsuyama, Masahiro Okuno-
Fujiwara, and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful discussions. 
Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games 
Kyoji Fukao 
The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 




Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an 
incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is affected by a realization of a 
common shock and where each player gets noisy private information of the shock.  For n -person 
symmetric games with two possible actions characterized by strategic complementarity, they showed 
that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise is uniquely determined.  The concept 
of global games is important not only as a theory of the most refined notion of equilibrium but also 
as a theory of coordination failures under private information.  From this viewpoint, this paper 
makes the theory of global games more general and more applicable to such problems.  The 
implications of the theory of global games are investigated in two specific models: a speculative 
attack model and a network externality model.    It is shown that both the monetary authority in the 
speculative attack model and the central planner in the network externality model will prefer the 
equilibrium in a global game with small noise to the worst equilibrium in the corresponding 
complete information game.  Therefore, they will welcome the existence of small noise, if they 
apply mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems.     
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In many coordination failure problems, it seems more plausible to assume that players do not 
exactly know other players' types.  Investors in a foreign exchange market may have some private 
information on balance-of-payments or on monetary authorities' intention to defend a fixed 
exchange rate (Krugman 1979).  Potential users of the new technology characterized by network 
externalities may face some uncertainty in other users' preference (Farrell and Saloner 1985) or in 
productivity of the new technology.     
In their seminal theoretical paper Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a 
global game, which is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is affected 
by a realization of a common shock and where each player gets noisy private information of the 
shock.  For n-person symmetric games with two possible actions characterized by strategic 
complementarity, they showed that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise is 
uniquely  determined.   
The concept of global games is important not only as a theory of the most refined notion of 
equilibrium but also as a theory of coordination failures under private information.  From this 
viewpoint, in Section 2 of this paper I make the theory of global games more general and more 
applicable to such problems.    First, Carlsson and van Damme (1991) assumed that the prior on the 
common shock is uniform and the payoff function is linear about the shock.1  I relax these 
assumptions.  Secondly, in order to get a unique equilibrium we do not need to assume that the 
radius of the support of the noise converges to zero.  Convergence of the variance of the noise to 
zero is sufficient.  Thirdly, the global game theory singles out an equilibrium not only when 
players observe shocks with infinitesimal noise but also when they observe the sum of a common 
shock and an infinitesimal idiosyncratic shock and each player's payoff depends on this sum.     
In the subsequent two sections, I apply the theory of global games to coordination failure 
problems.  In Section 3, I study a speculative attack model under incomplete information.  It is 
                                             
1Carlsson and van Damme (1990) study a more general case for two player game.     2 
shown that a monetary authority, who applies mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems, 
will prefer to keep investors' information on monetary authorities' intention to defend a fixed 
exchange rate incomplete.  In Section 4, by using a network externality model, I study welfare 
implications of small noise.    In the network externality model, I assume that the payoff function is 
linear about both the realization of a common shock and the number of other players who choose a 
new technology.    I also assume that the common shock and noises are independent normal random 
variables.    Under these assumptions, we can derive stronger results than in preceding sections: the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is uniquely determined for a certain set of pairs of standard deviation of 
common shock and that of noises. 
 
2. n-person Symmetric Global Games 
Suppose there are n players, i = 1,..., n.    The set of all the players is denoted by N.  Players' 
payoffs are affected by a common shock s.  Before the players simultaneously decide their actions, 
each player i observes the shock with noise: 
 
(1)  θi = s + εi. 
 
The shock s is drawn from a distribution on [s,  s ] with a strictly positive and continuously 
differentiable density h.  The  noises  ε1, ε2,..., εn are independent of s and have a joint distribution 
Φ with a continuous and bounded density ϕ.  ϕ is symmetric about any εi  and  εj :  ϕ (ε1,.., εi,.., 
εj,.., εn) = ϕ (ε1,.., εj,.., εi,.., εn) for any i, j ∈ Ν  and any {ε1, ε2,..., εn}.  The support of Φ is 
contained in a ball around zero with radius γ.  The support of each player's private information is 
denoted by [θ,  θ ]. 
Each player i has two possible actions, α and β.  Every player's payoff has an identical 
functional form and is affected by other player's action in the same way.  Each player's marginal 
gain by choosing α instead of β is expressed as 
 
            v   
 m




where m denotes a number of the other players who choose α.  s is a realization of the common 
shock.  v (m / (n − 1), s ) is differentiable and strictly increasing in s.  The game is characterized 
by strategic complementarity:  v (m / (n −1), s) is strictly increasing in m / (n − 1).  We also 
assume that v (m / (n − 1), s ) satisfies v (0,    s ) > − ∞, v (1,  s ) < +∞, 
 
(2)      v (0,  s   ) > 0, 
and 
(3)      v (1,    s ) < 0. 
 
Inequalities (2) and (3) imply that for high enough shocks, action β is strictly dominated by α, and 
for low enough shocks, action α is strictly dominated by β. 
We first study Nash Equilibria of the complete information games that correspond to our 
incomplete information games.  Suppose there is no noise in observation of the shock s and s is 
common  knowledge.  Let  sαβ denote the unique solution of 
 
(4)     v (1, sαβ) = 0, 
 
and let  s αβ denote the unique solution of   
 
(5)     v (0,  s αβ) = 0. 
 
Then we have inequalities: s < sαβ <  s αβ <s .  If  s ≤ s < sαβ, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
B = (β1,..., βn), in which all the players choose β.  If s αβ < s ≤  s , then A = (α1,..., αn), in which 
all the players choose α, is the unique Nash equilibrium.  If sαβ < s <  s αβ, there are two Nash 
equilibria in pure strategy, A and B, and one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy, in which each 
player assigns identical probability q to action α. q is determined by 
(6)       ∑
  n − 1
 m = 0
 v  
 m






 m (1 − q )
 n − 1 − m = 0.
 
Figure 1 summarizes the Nash equilibrium correspondence of the complete information games.  4 
When sαβ < s <  s αβ, both A and B are strict equilibria, i.e. equilibria in pure strategies in which 
each player actually looses if he deviates unilaterally.  Therefore both equilibria satisfy the 
conditions imposed by almost all the refined equilibrium notion such as perfectness (Selten 1975) 
and strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986).2 
Next we study Bayesian Nash equilibria of the incomplete information games.  Let qi (θi) 
denote player i's probability of taking action α when he observes θi.  Player  i's behavioral strategy 
is a function qi (·) from [θ,  θ ] to [0, 1].    When all the players except i follow strategies {q1(·),..., 
qi − 1(·), qi + 1(·),..., qn(·)}, player i with private information θi expects the following marginal gain 
by choosing α instead of β: 










 v  
 m

















qj (s + εj ) ∏
 k ∉ λ
m
− i and k ∈ N− i















h (s ) ϕ(ε1,..., εi −1, θi − s, εi +1,…, εn ) dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεnds
     dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεnds  
where N−i  is the set of all the players except i, {1, 2,..., i − 1, i + 1,..., n }.  λm−i denotes a 
selection of m players from N−i and Λm−i, the set of all such selections.  Since θj = s + εj, the 
fraction in equation (7) is the conditional joint density of the shock s and the types of player i' s 
opponents, θ1,..., θi − 1, θi + 1,..., θn, given player i' s type θi.    A Bayesian equilibrium is a set of 
strategies {q1(·),..., qn(·)} such that, for each player i and every possible value of θi, behavioral 
strategy qi (θi ) maximizes player i' s expected payoff, that is, qi (θi ) = 1 if Vi (θi ) > 0, qi (θi ) = 0 
                                             
2The strict equilibrium is the most refined equilibrium notion that is discussed in van Damme 
(1991a).  van Damme (1991b) surveys non-cooperative game theories that select a unique 
equilibrium from two strict equilibria in 2  ｴ 2  games.   5 
if Vi (θi ) < 0, and qi (θi ) ∈ [0, 1] if Vi (θi ) = 0.    On the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
in behavioral strategies, we claim the following: 
 
Proposition 1.  In our incomplete information games, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
point in behavioral strategies. 
 
Proof.  Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Weber (1985) shows that if a game satisfies the two 
regularity conditions, Equicontinuous payoffs (R1) and Absolutely continuous information (R2), 
then there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium point.  Finiteness of the number of actions for each 
player is sufficient to imply R1.    Under Assumption 1, the joint distribution of (s, θ1, θ2,...,θn ) as 
well as the marginal distribution of each θi and s has a density.    This implies R2.   
 
Our main results concerning the characteristics of the Bayesian Nash equilibria are 
summarized as follows: 
 
Theorem 1. Let sG denote the unique solution of the equation: 
(8)    G (s 
G) ≡ ∑
  n − 1










sG  satisfies sαβ < sG <  s αβ.  For every  δ  ∈ (0,  min [sG  − sαβ,  s αβ  − sG]) there exists 
positive  γ, such that whenever the support of Φ is contained in a ball around zero with radius    γ, 
the equilibrium behavioral strategy qi (θi ) for every i ∈ N satisfies qi (θi ) = 0 for all    θi ∈ [θ, sG 
− δ), and qi (θi ) = 1 for all    θi ∈ (sG + δ,  θ ].   
 
For the proof we will use the following lemmas. 
 
Lemma 1.  Under Assumption 1, the unconditional probability of the event "player i's type θi is 
lower than other m players' types and higher than n−1− m players' types" is equal to 1/n for every m 
∈ {0, 1, .., n −1}: 6 




















                     
          m  integrals   n −1−m integrals 
 
Proof.  L e t   π be a permutation of {1, 2,..., n  }.   Π denotes the set of all the n! permutations.   
Let Zπ be the event that the permutation of the players sorted in increasing order of their noise εj 
coincides with π.  For example, if π = {n, n −1,...,1}, then Zπ = {εn < εn −1 <····< ε1}.  Since Zπ 
and Zπ'  are mutually exclusive whenever π  ｭ  π', and the density function ϕ (ε1,  ε2,...,  εn) is 
bounded and symmetrical about any εi  and  εj, the probability of Zπ is equal to 1/ n ! for all π ∈ Π.  
For every m ∈ {0, 1,.., n −1}, there are (n − 1)! permutations in which the n − m th number is equal 
to i.    Therefore the probability of the event that εi is n − m th smaller in {ε1, ε2,..., εn} is equal to (n 
− 1)!/n!= 1/n.    The left-hand side of equation (9) denotes the probability of this event.  
 
Lemma 2.    Let hγ+(s ) and hγ−(s ) denote the maximum and minimum value of h (·) on [s − γ, s + γ].  
There exists a constant k such that for any γ ∈ (0, (s   − s )/ 2] and s ∈ [s + γ,  s   − γ], 







 ≤ 1 + k  γ ,  
 
and  







 ≥ 1 − k  γ .  
 
Proof.   S i n c e   h (s ) is strictly positive and continuously differentiable, there exist maxs ∈ [s, 
s ] | h' (s )| and positive mins ∈ [s,  s ] | h (s )|.  Let  k = (2 maxs ∈ [s,  s ] | h' (s )| ) / (mins ∈ [s,  s ] 
| h (s )| ), and we get the two inequalities.  
 
We turn to the proof of Theorem 1. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. Our assumptions on the marginal payoff function v (m/(n−1), s) imply 
that equation (8) always has a unique solution which satisfies sαβ<sG<s αβ. 7 
If we choose γ  as γ < (sαβ − s)/ 2, then type θi ≤ (sαβ + s )/ 2 is sure that s is smaller than 
sαβ and prefers β to α.    It implies that there is no equilibrium with qi (θi) > 0 for any i ∈N and any 
θi ∈ [θ, (sαβ + s )/ 2].  By a similar proof, we can show that if γ < (s   − s αβ)/ 2, there is no 
equilibrium with qi (θi ) < 1 for any i ∈N, and any θi ∈ [(s αβ +s )/ 2,  θ ].   
Now we study the equilibrium behavior for θi ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, sG − δ) and θi ∈ (sG + δ, 
(s αβ +s )/ 2).    First we look for simple equilibria of the form   
 
( 1 1 )      qi (θi ) = 


 0  if  ￿i < x
 1  if  ￿i > x.  
 
In such equilibria, type θi expects the following marginal gain by choosing αi instead of βi.   
(12)    Fi (θi, x ) ≡










 x − s
…∫
 +∞
 x − s
 ∫
 x − s
 −∞
…∫




n − 1, s  

  
                          
            m  integrals      n −1−m integrals 
 
    







h (s ) ϕ(ε1,..., εi −1, θi − s, εi +1,…, εn ) dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεnds
     dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεnds .     
By Lebesgue's Theorem of Bounded Convergence (see Weir 1973), the continuity of ϕ (·) implies 
that Fi(θi, x) is continuous in θi.  Therefore, the equilibrium x must satisfy Fi(x, x) = 0.  By a 
simple translation, we get 
 














































ϕ(ε1,...,εn ) dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεndεi . 
 
                
      m  integrals   n −1−m integrals 8 
 
Lemma 1, 2 and the fact that v (·, s) is strictly increasing in s, imply that for small enough γ, the 
right-hand side of the equation is smaller than G (sG) = 0 on x ∈ ((sαβ + s )/ 2, sG − δ).  Therefore 
this class of equilibria with x ∈ ((sαβ + s )/ 2, sG − δ) does not exist.    A similar proof applies for x 
∈ (sG + δ, (s αβ +s )/ 2).   
Next we study more general equilibria.  Suppose that for any γ > 0 there exists a pair of a 
distribution  Φ and a Bayesian Nash equilibrium profile {q1(·),...,  qn(·)};  the support of Φ is 
contained in a ball around zero with radius γ and the equilibrium profile satisfies qi(θi ) > 0 for some 
i∈ N   and  some  θi ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, sG − δ).  In  the  equilibrium,  Vi(θi), type θi's expected marginal 
gain by choosing α instead of β, is expressed by equation (7).  Let Θi* be the set {θi| Vi(θi ) ≥ 0 
and (sαβ + s)/ 2 < θi < sG − δ } and let Θ*= ∪ i ∈ N Θi*.  Since qi(θi) is an optimal strategy, Vi 
(θi ) ≥ 0 if qi (θi ) > 0.    Therefore if qi (θi) > 0 for some i ∈ N and some θi ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, sG − δ), 
then Θ* is non-empty.    For γ < (sαβ − s)/ 2, Θ* have a lower bound that is greater than (sαβ + s)/ 2.   
Lebesgue's Theorem of Bounded Convergence implies that Vi (θi ) is continuous in θi.  These  two 
facts imply that inf(Θ*)∈ Θ* for small γ.  Without loss of generality, suppose Vi (inf(Θ*)) = 0.  
Since all the players whose type θj is smaller than inf(Θ*) will play β, Vi (inf(Θ*)) is equal to or 
smaller than Fi (inf(Θ*), inf(Θ*)), which is smaller than zero for small enough γ.  A  contradiction.  
A similar proof with a contradiction applies for x ∈ (sG + δ, (s αβ+s )/ 2).  
The intuition for the nonexistence of the simple equilibrium that is defined by equation (11) 
with x ∈ [θ, sG − δ) or x ∈ (sG + δ,θ ] is very simple.  Suppose there exists such an equilibrium 
with x ∈ [sαβ, sG − δ), and player i gets private information θi that is infinitesimally higher than x.  
Since player i' s private information is not so favorable for action α, he would choose α only when 
he expects many other players choose α.  Infinitesimal noises make such coordination impossible.  
If the support of the noises is small compared with the support of the common shock and the density 
of the common shock is smooth, the private information θi will convey almost no information on εi.  
Player i' s posterior joint distribution of his noise and the other players' noises is very close to the 
prior joint distribution.  Therefore, he expects that one half of the other players observe θj to be 9 
lower than x and he can not rely on other players' coordination in choosing α.  The  critical  point  sG 
depends on each player's expectation of the relative position of his noise with the other players' 
noises.  Since the unconditional probability of the event "player i's type θi is lower than other m  
players' types and higher than n − 1− m players' types" is equal to 1/n for every m ∈ {0, 1, .., n −1}, 
sG is determined by equation (8).3 
Next we generalize our results.    First we show 
  
Corollary.  Assume that the support of Φ is contained in a ball around zero with radius γ, which is 
smaller than min{ (sαβ − s )/ 2, (s   − s αβ)/ 2 }.  Then for every  δ ∈ (0, min [sG − sαβ,  s αβ 
− sG])  there exists positive σ ε2 such that whenever σε2 ( the unconditional variance of εi)  is 
positive and smaller than σ ε2, each players' behavioral strategy    qi (θi ) satisfies qi (θi ) = 0 for 
any  θi ∈ [θ, sG − δ), and qi (θi ) = 1 for any    θi ∈ (sG + δ,  θ ]. 
 
Proof.  For θi ∈ [θ, (sαβ + s)/ 2] and θi ∈ [(s αβ +s )/ 2,θ ], the same proof as in Theorem 
1  applies.  For  θi ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, sG − δ) and θi ∈ (sG + δ, (s αβ +s )/ 2), we first look for simple 
equilibria of the form   
 
          qi (θi ) = 0 if θi < x and qi (θi ) = 1 if θi > x.  
 
Chebyshev's inequality implies Prob [|  εi |  ≥ σε0.5] ≤ σε.    By this inequality, we get 
                                             
3If the number of players is two or the function v (m / (n-1), s) can be expressed as the sum of a 
linear function of m / (n-1) and a function of s, the unique equilibrium behavior in a global game 
with vanishing noise will be identical with the unique equilibrium behavior that is selected out of 
multiple equilibria of the corresponding complete information game by risk-dominance criterion of 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).  But, in general, the two equilibria differ. (See Carlsson and van 
Damme  1991.)   10 
(14)  Fi (x, x ) ≤























ε  (x )




ε (x ) + σεh
−
 γ (x )
v  
 m
n − 1, x + σ
 0.5
ε   
,




ε  (x )




ε (x ) + σεh
 +
 γ (x )
v  
 m
n − 1, x + σ
 0.5





         ∫
 













ϕ(ε1,...,εn ) dε1…dεi −1dεi +1…dεndεi  
 
                         
               m  integrals    n −1−m integrals 






  γ (x )




ε (x ) + σεh
−
 γ (x )
v  
 m
n − 1, x + γ  
, 
              
h
  −
  γ (x )




ε (x ) + σεh
 +
 γ (x )
v  
 m





          ∫
 





















Lemma 1 and 2 imply that for small enough σε2, the right-hand side of the equation is smaller than 
G (sG) = 0 on x ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, sG − δ).    Therefore this class of equilibria with x ∈ ((sαβ + s)/ 2, 
sG − δ) does not exist.    A similar proof applies for x ∈ (sG + δ, (s αβ + s )/ 2).    For more general 
class of equilibria, the same proof as in Theorem 1 applies.  
 
Now, we study the games in which each player's payoff is affected by the sum of a common 
shock and an infinitesimal idiosyncratic shock.  Suppose εi is not a noise but an idiosyncratic 
shock and player i' s payoff is affected by θi = s + εi  instead  of  s.   
            v   
 m
n − 1, θi  
.
 11 
We keep all the other assumptions from our original model.    In this new model, equations, (7), (12), 
and inequality (13) will hold if we replace both the term v (m/ (n − 1), s) in equations (7) and (12) 
and the term v (m/ (n − 1), s + γ ) in inequality (13), with v (m/ (n − 1), θi).    This fact implies that 
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are still true.     
 
3. A Speculative Attack Model 
In this section we apply the theory of global games to a speculative attack model in which 
investors' information on monetary authorities' intention to defend a fixed exchange rate is 
incomplete.  Consider a foreign exchange market of a small open country with a fixed exchange 
rate system.  The market is opened two times, at the first and the second period.  There are three 
types of participants, investors, the domestic monetary authority, and pure traders.  There are two 
types of assets, domestic and foreign currency.  Both currencies bear zero nominal interest.  
Neither foreign residents nor foreign monetary authorities do not hold domestic currency.  All the 
investors are domestic residents.     
There are n risk neutral investors.  At the beginning of the first period, each investor owns 
A/n unit of domestic currency.    Investors consume all their assets in the second period.    To buy or 
sell one unit of foreign currency, investors pay c/ 2 unit of foreign currency as transaction cost.    In 
order to buy consumption goods, domestic currency is required.  Therefore, if an investor 
purchases one unit of foreign currency in the first period, he will resell it in the second period and 
the total transaction cost will be c.4  In the first period, each investor choose one of two actions, 
converting all the domestic currency into the foreign currency in the first period and repurchase the 
domestic currency in the second period, or holding domestic currency until the second period.    We 
call the first action speculation and the second non-speculation.  Each speculating investor will 
incur transaction cost cA/n.  Let  k denote the number of investors who speculate in the first period.   
                                             
4If we assume that the investors hold assets with interest, then c will consist of the transaction cost 
and interest rate differential between the two countries.     12 
Then the total demand for foreign currency by the investors amounts to kA/n.   
Net purchase of foreign currency by pure traders is equal to the current account deficit of the 
country.  Let  D denote the current account deficit in the first period.    D is a random variable with 
cumulative density function H (·).    The investors do not observe a realization of D when they make 
decisions on speculation in the first period.   
We model the monetary authority’s behavior as follows.    Let R denote the potential reserves 
the monetary authority is willing to use to defend the initial fixed rate.  If the demand for foreign 
currency is greater than R in the first period, 
R
  < 
k
n A +D , 
 
then the domestic currency will be devaluated 100e percent in the second period.  Otherwise the 
fixed rate will be kept constant in the second period.    R is a random variable with a support [R,R ].  
Each investor gets private information on R:  
           θ i = R  + ε i  
 
where εi denotes  noise.   
The random variables D, R, and εi satisfy the following conditions.     
 
A1) H (·), the cumulative density function of D is continuously differentiable and satisfies 
 
H '(x ) >  0      f o r   a l l   x  ∈ [R −A,  R ], 
H (R −A ) >  0,   
H (R ) < 1, 
−c + e {1 −H (R )} > 0, 
and 
−c + e {1 −H (R −A)} < 0. 
 
A2)  R  is drawn from a distribution on [R,  R ] with a strictly positive and continuously 13 
differentiable  density.   
A3)  The  noises  ε1, ε2,..., εn are independent of s and have a joint distribution Φ with a continuous 
and bounded density ϕ.  ϕ is symmetric about any εi and εj :  ϕ (ε1,.., εi,.., εj,.., εn) = ϕ (ε1,.., εj,.., 
εi,.., εn) for any i, j ∈ Ν  and  any  {ε1, ε2,..., εn}.  The  support  of  Φ is contained in a ball around 
zero with radius γ.   
 
To simplify the model, we assume that in the first period the authority keeps the initial fixed 
rate and is willing to supply the amount of foreign currency that the market wants to buy, kA/n +D.  
If we assume that the authority stops selling foreign currency as soon as it uses up R, we would have 
to model the dynamic process in the first period market.     
We assume that 
0 < c < e < 1. 
Therefore, if an investor expects devaluation, he will have an incentive to convert his domestic 
currency into foreign currency in the first period and repurchase the domestic currency in the second 
period.  The price of the consumption good is set in world markets and the foreign price level is 
constant and equal to one.  The initial fixed exchange rate is normalized to be one.  Under these 
assumptions investors' payoff is summarized by Table 1.     
The sequence of events in our model is summarized as follows.     
1)  Nature chooses the potential amount of intervention, R and the current account deficit of the 
first period, D.   
2)    Each investor gets private information on R .    He observes neither D nor R.   
3)  The foreign exchange market of the first period is opened.  The investors simultaneously 
decide whether speculate or not.  The monetary authority keeps the initial fixed rate and supplies 
the amount of foreign currency that the market wants to buy, kA/n +D, where k denotes the number 
of investors who speculate.     
4)    If monetary authority's foreign currency supply in the first period is greater than R, the authority 
will devaluate the domestic currency 100e percent in the second period.  Otherwise the authority 14 
will keep the initial fixed rate.    In both cases, the authority sustains the fixed rate within the second 
period and is willing to supply the amount of foreign currency that the market wants to buy.  The 
investors consume all their wealth.     
 
We study investor i's marginal gain by choosing speculation instead of non-speculation.    Let 
m denote a number of the other investors who speculate.  If investor i does not speculate, the 
probability of devaluation will be equal to 1−F (R −m A / n).  Therefore,  investor  i's marginal gain 





n− 1, −R  
 = −c  +e 
   





n −1A  

   
. 
 
We first consider the complete information case in which the investors observe R before 
participating the first period market.    Let Rαβ and  Rαβ be defined by 
 
(16) − c + e {1 −H (R αβ)} = 0, 
and 
(17) − c + e {1 −H (R αβ) −A } = 0. 
 
If Rαβ < R <  R αβ, there will be two Nash equilibria in pure strategy.  The one in which all the 
investors speculate and the probability of the devaluation is 1−F (R −A) and the other in which no 
investor speculates and the probability of the devaluation is 1−F (R).   
Next we study incomplete information case.  If we replace −R with s , the marginal gain 
function v (m / (n  − 1), −R ) will satisfy all the assumptions in Section 2.    Therefore we can apply 
Theorem 1 to our speculative attack model.  The critical value of the potential intervention RG is 
determined by 
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R  G satisfies Rαβ  < R  G<  Rαβ.  Assume that noise is very small.  Then Theorem  1 15 
implies that if an investor gets private information that is lower than RG, he will speculate.    And if 
an investor gets private information that is higher than RG, he will not speculate.     
If actual R is smaller than RG, the probability of the devaluation will be 1−F (R −A). And if 
actual R is greater than RG, the probability of the devaluation will be 1−F (R ).  So we must be 
interested in the factors determining RG.    Equation (18) implies that as transaction cost c decreases 
or as the expected width of devaluation e increases, RG will become higher.     
In order to explicitly solve equation (16), (17), and (18), let us specify the probability 
distribution of the current account deficit.  Suppose that the distribution is highly concentrated 
around D =D *.5    Then we can get approximate solutions of equation (16), (17), and (18):     
  R αβ≈D *, 
  R αβ≈D *+A , 
R




A .    
 
In this example, the relative sizes of the transaction cost and the possible devaluation rate determine 
the critical amount of foreign reserves.  If the transaction cost is close to the size of the possible 
devaluation, the monetary authority will only need to prepare reserves as much as the expected 
current account deficit in order to defend the fixed exchange rate.     
Assume that the monetary authority can choose one of two situations, the complete 
information case and the incomplete information case with small noise.    The authority has to make 
a decision before the authority knows realization of R, which is exogenously determined.  Also 
assume that the authority applies mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems.    That is, the 
authority holds the worst case in whole account.  Then the monetary authority will prefer the 
incomplete information situation with small noises over the complete information situation.6   
                                             
5We assume that H(D*−ε) is close to 0 and H(D*+ε) is close to 1 for a small value ε > 0.   
6Bhattacharya and Weller (1992) constructed a model in which the central bank, when it intervenes 
in the foreign exchange market, chooses not to reveal precisely what their targets are.  In their 
model, investors are assumed to be risk averse.  Therefore, the impreciseness of investors' 16 
 
4. The Network-Externality Model with Normal Random Shocks 
Since there is no rigorous microeconomic foundation in our speculative attack model, it is 
difficult to evaluate national welfare in each equilibrium.  In this section, by using a network 
externality model, we analyze welfare implication of small noise.     
Consider a technology characterized by network externalities.  There are n identical agents.  
The agents simultaneously decide whether to adopt the technology (action α) or not to adopt (action 
β).  The more the agents coordinate to adopt the technology, the higher their utility.  The payoff 
of the agents who do not adopt the technology is normalized to be zero.  If agent i chooses α, his 
payoff is 
 
(19)       v i   
 m
n − 1, s  
 = − c  + r  
m
n − 1 + s  
 
where m  denotes the number of the other agents who choose α and s   denotes a common shock 
that affects the productivity of the technology.  r is positive.  We assume the following 
information  structure.  Each  agent  i observes θi that consists of a common shock s and a noise εi: 
 
         θi = s + εi. 
 
s and εi are independent normal random variables with means zero and standard deviations σs > 0, 
σε > 0 respectively.  The noises, ε1,..., εn, are independent of each other.  Each agent i knows 
neither other agents' private information nor the composition of θi. 
Since the support of each noise is not bounded, we can not directly apply Theorem 1 to this 
model.  But as Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show for two player game, under the normal 
distribution assumption we can derive stronger results than in Theorem 1:  the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium is uniquely determined for a certain set of (σε, σs).   
                                                                                                                                  
information increases central bank's ability to manipulate the exchange rate.  For general 
discussion on central bank secrecy, see Cukierman (1992). 17 
To begin with, we consider the complete information games that correspond to our incomplete 
information game.    Suppose there is no noise and s is directly observable.    If s < c  − r, there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium B in which all users choose β.  If s > c , there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium A in which all users choose α.  If c  − r < s < c , there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.     
Now we study our incomplete information game.  For low enough θi, E[vi (1, s )| θi ] < 0 
and action α (to adopt the technology) is strictly dominated. Conversely, for high enough θi, E[vi (0, 
s )| θi ] > 0 and action β (not to adopt the technology) is strictly dominated.     
First we look for simple equilibria defined by equation (11).  That is, all the agents set a 
common critical value x .    In such equilibria, agent i who observes θi expects the following gain by 
choosing α instead of β.7   
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  du  
 
where σz2 denotes Var[θj| θi] = (2σs2σε2 + σε4)/ (σs2 + σε2).  Since function Fi is continuous 
and ∂Fi / ∂θi > 0 for all θi and all x, Fi implicitly defines agent i' s reaction function:    when all of 
agent i' s opponents take a common switching value x, then the optimal switching value for player i, 
θi, is determined by Fi(θi,  x)  = 0.  The necessary and sufficient condition of an equilibrium 
switching value x is 
 
                                             
7Note that 










    










    















(See Hoel 1962, p. 200.) 18 
        Fi(x, x ) = 0. 
 
Fi(x, x) is strictly concave up at x > 0 and concave down at x < 0.  Therefore, we get a sufficient 
condition for a unique equilibrium switching value x:8 
 
(21) 
dFi (x, x )
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In the same way as in Theorem 1, we can show that under this condition there is no other Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium of a more complicated form.    The shaded region of Figure 2 represents the set of 
(σε, σs) that satisfies the sufficient condition (21).    If condition (21) is not satisfied and Fi (0, 0) = 
− c + r / 2 is close to zero, then we will have three simple form equilibria.     
To carry out welfare analysis, consider agent i's expected payoff evaluated before the 
revelation of θi.  Suppose all the agents, including agent i, take a simple behavioral strategy 
defined by equation (11) with a switching value x.  Then  agent  i expects the following payoff: 
 
(22)        Wi (x ) = ∫
 + ∞
 x
Fi (θi , x ) ψ(θi ) dθi  
 
where ψ(θi ) denotes the density function of θi.    By a differentiation, we get 
 
(23)     
dWi (x )
d x  = − Fi (x , x ) ψ(x ) − 
r 
n  − 1 ∑
j ∈ N− i∫
 + ∞
 x
g (x θi ) ψ(θi ) dθi 
 
where function g (θj | θi ) is the conditional density of θj  given θi.  The second term in the right 
hand side of equation (23) denotes a spillover effect:  a decrease in the switching value of all but 
one agent bestows an external benefit upon the remaining agent.9    This fact implies that the unique 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal and all the agents will gain by coordinating to 
decrease their common switching value.     
                                             
8This condition is almost identical with Carlsson and van Damme's (1990). 
9For a more detailed discussion on spillover effects, see Cooper and John (1988).     19 
Next we compare our Bayesian Nash equilibrium with Nash equilibria of the corresponding 
complete information games.  Suppose there is no noise and s is directly observable.  Then the 
economy can get stuck at a set of inefficient equilibria in which no agent adopts the technology at all 
s ∈ (−･, c ].    In such a worst case scenario the expected welfare of a representative agent evaluated 
before the revelation of s is   
 
          ∫
 + ∞
 c
(− c  + r  + s ) h (s ) ds 
 
 
where h (s ) is the density function of s.  On the other hand, in the incomplete information game 
with infinitesimal noises there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.  Equation (20) implies that 
the switching value is close to c − r / 2.  This value is identical with the solution of equation (8).  
Equation (20) and (22) imply that the expected welfare of a representative agent in this equilibrium 
is 
 
            ∫
 + ∞




(− c  + r  + s ) h (s ) ds  + O(σε)
 
 
which is greater than the expected welfare in the worst case of the complete information games for 
small enough σε.  Therefore a central planner, who applies mini-max principle to multiple 
equilibrium problems will prefer the incomplete information situation with small noises over the 
complete information situation.     
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
As more economists interested in coordination failure problems, the question how one of 
multiple equilibria is selected becomes more important.  By generalizing Carlsson and van 
Damme's theory of global games, this paper studied a selection mechanism under incomplete 
information.  The implications of the theory of global games are investigated in two specific 
models: a speculative attack model and a network externality model.     20 
Even when the monetary authority possesses relatively large foreign exchange reserves, the 
speculative attack can be a self-fulfilling equilibrium under the complete information situation.  
Each investor finds speculation profitable, when he believes that many other investors will speculate.   
Suppose that there is a common shock and each investor gets noisy private information.    The noise 
is small.    Then each investor expects that one half of other investors get worse news for speculation 
than his.    This expectation makes coordinative speculative attack impossible.    It is shown that the 
monetary authority in the speculative attack model and the central planner in the network externality 
model will prefer the equilibrium in a global game with small noise to the worst equilibrium in the 
corresponding complete information game.  Therefore, they will welcome the existence of small 
noise, if they apply mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems.     21 
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Figure 2. The set of (σε, σs ) that satisfies the sufficient condition (21) for a unique equilibrium. 
 